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Abstract
This paper is the first to systematically study the trade effects of economic
integration agreements (EIAs) between the European Union - one of the driving
forces behind the recent explosion of EIAs - and third countries. We thoroughly
disentangle the ex post effects of these EIAs: 1) we allow for differential timing of
effects of EIAs, 2) we look at the effects on total trade flows as well as on the margins,
3) we allow for heterogeneity across EIAs and 4) we estimate the effects of EIAs on
trade flows for each EU country individually. We use a panel on aggregate imports
and exports for the period of 1988-2013 and control for endogeneity of EIAs and
multilateral resistance. We find that EIAs have complex and heterogeneous effects
on trade flows between the EU and the rest of the world. EIAs have differential
effects on trade, depending on the characteristics of the EIAs and the EU member
state. We also find that EIAs have positive effects on EU exports, but less on
imports, and that a zero effect on the total trade flows sometimes covers opposing
effects on the intensive and extensive margins.
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1 Introduction
In the past two decades, the number of economic integration agreements (EIA)1 notified
to the WTO has exploded. In 2014 alone, ten new free trade agreements entered into
force2. This brings the total of active trade agreements notified to the WTO as of
February 1, 2015 to a stunning 402. With the exception of Mongolia, all WTO members
have signed at least one trade agreement.
Not only has the number of EIAs being signed and negotiated exploded in recent
years, the economic literature investigating the impact of EIAs has grown equally fast.
This has led to tremendous improvements in methodology. While earlier studies report
very mixed results on the trade effects of EIAs (see Cipollina and Salvatici 2010 for a
comprehensible meta-analysis), recent studies start to find more consistent numbers (see
for example Baier and Bergstrand 2007; Magee 2008; Kohl 2014 and Baier, Bergstrand
and Feng 2014).
Especially Europe has been a driving force behind the explosion of EIAs signed and
negotiated in recent years. In 2012, 23% of all imports to the EU27 and 27% of all EU27
exports were mitigated by EIAs. When we also take into account trade agreements that
had not yet entered into force or that were being negotiated, these numbers go up to
58% for imports and 70% for exports3.
This makes one wonder about the exact impact of these EU trade agreements on
trade flows. However, the trade effects of EIAs depend on the characteristics of the spe-
cific countries involved. It is therefore inadvisable to extrapolate international findings
to the European context.
There exists a vast literature studying trade agreements in a European context.
However, most papers look at the effect of the European Union itself (for example
Micco, Stein and Ordon˜ez 2003; Baldwin, Frankel and Melitz 2006 and Kelejian, Tavlas
and Petroulas 2012, amongst others, study the effect of the euro on intra-bloc trade;
Magee 2008 and Geldi 2012, amongst others, study whether the EU is trade creating or
trade diverting and Bussie`re, Fidrmuc and Schnatz 2008 and Spies and Marques 2009,
amongst other, study the trade effects of enlargements of the EU).
A small number of studies have also touched upon the subject of the effects of the
European trade agreements with third countries (see for example Bensassi, Mrquez-
Ramos and Martnez-Zarzoso 2012 on EuroMed trade agreements between certain EU
member states and four North African countries; Persson and Wilhelmsson 2006 on
EU trade preferences for developing countries; Camarero, Go´mez and Tamarit 2012 on
1Baier, Bergstrand, Egger and McLaughlin (2008) define EIAs as “treaties between economic units
in the case of international EIAs, between nations to reduce policy-controlled barriers to the flow of
goods, services, capital, labour, etc”. We distinguish three main types of EIAs, reflecting different
intensities of trade integration: preferential trade agreements (PTA), free trade agreements (FTA) and
custom unions and common markets (CU).
2rtais.wto.org
3Own calculations based on COMEXT data.
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free trade agreements between the EU15 and Chile, Iceland, South-Korea, Mexico and
Norway, amongst others). However, none of these papers have systematically studied
the effects of the trade agreements between the European Union and third countries.
Moreover, as Kohl (2014) points out, important methodological improvements applied
at the generalist level are not always as rigorously applied in ‘specialist’ studies, making
it difficult to compare results. This paper is intented to fill this gap.
In this paper we quantify ex post the effects of these agreements on trade flows
between the European Union and the rest of the world. We use a panel on aggregate
imports and exports between 27 EU countries and 203 third countries and territories
for the period of 1988-2013. Following the empirical approach by Baier and Bergstrand
(2007), we account for the endogeneity of EIAs by including three sets of fixed effects
(importer-time, exporter-time and country pair) and alternatively, by using fifth differ-
ences.
We contribute to the literature by thoroughly disentangling the heterogeneous effects
of EIAs. We do this in several different ways. First, we allow for differential timing
of effects, by including 5- and 10-year lags and calculating average treatment effects.
Consistent with the literature, we find that medium-term and long-term reaction effects
are important.
Secondly, we do not only look at the effects of all these factors on total trade flows,
but we also consider the impact on the intensive and extensive margin. While there
are already some papers that explore differential timing of EIA effects or the effects
of EIAs on the margins, Baier, Bergstrand and Feng (2014) and Florensa, Ma´rquez-
Ramos and Recalde (2015) are two of the only papers so far that allow for differential
timing of different types of EIAs, while at the same time looking at the margins and
applying rigorous econometric methods4. We find that no effects on the total trade flows
sometimes cover opposing effects on the intensive and extensive margin. Both margins
appear thus to be important for capturing the true trade effects of EIAs.
Thirdly, we dive deeply into the heterogeneity across EIAs. We start by considering
various types of EIAs by including separate dummies for preferential trade agreements
(PTAs), free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs unions and common market agree-
ments (CUs). Then, we also look at the trade effect of each EIA separately. We find
that EIAs have very heterogeneous effects on trade flows. Similar to Kohl (2014), we
find that most separate EIAs have no impact on trade. This is obscured when only
looking at a general EIA dummy.
Finally, we estimate the effects of EIAs on trade flows for each EU country indi-
vidually. As expected, we find that EIAs have heterogeneous effects on the different
countries of the European Union.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the gravity
model and describes the empirical methodology used. Section 3 discusses the data, while
4It is especially important to control for multilateral resistance and endogeneity of EIAs.
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section 4 presents the main results and findings. Section 5 concludes.
2 Methodology
2.1 The gravity model
In this paper, we use a panel gravity model with three sets of fixed effects, as proposed
by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and subsequently used by a large number of studies.
Since its introduction by Tinbergen (1962), the gravity model has become the most
applied model for analyzing trade flows. In its most simple form, the gravity model states
that trade flows between a country pair depend negatively on the distance between the
two countries and positively on the mass of each country.
During the decades following Tinbergen’s seminal work, many authors have come up
with theoretical foundations for the gravity equation. Once a theoretical orphan, the
gravity model is now a fully-fledged model with strong theoretical micro-foundations.
Though estimating the trade elasticity is model-specific and different types of quantita-
tive models (like Armington, Krugman, Ricardian and Melitz models) might yield dif-
ferent structural interpretations of it, Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clarez (2012)
argue that the gravity equation offers a common way to estimate the trade elasticity and
therefore a common estimator of the gains from trade, despite the different micro-level
predictions of different quantitative trade models. They adopt a broad definition of the
gravity model and suggest that a trade model satisfies the gravity equation if bilateral
trade flows can be decomposed as follows:
lnXijt = Ait +Bjt + γlnτijt + υijt (1)
where i, j = 1, ..., N countries; Xijt denotes bilateral trade flows between country i and
country j at time t; Ait denotes the characteristics of country i at time t; Bjt denotes
the characteristics of country j at time t; γ denotes the partial elasticity of bilateral
imports with respect to variable trade costs; τijt denotes variable trade costs and υijt
denotes parameters that are country pair-specific but different from variable trade costs.
This general gravity model can easily be extended to accommodate a range of vari-
ables in which the researcher might be interested, explaining the popularity of the gravity
model. One common extension is the inclusion of a dummy variable when two countries
share an EIA, allowing to evaluate the trade effects of EIAs. The gravity equation then
takes the following form:
lnXijt = Ait +Bjt + γlnτijt + ζEIAijt + υ
′
ijt (2)
with ζ denoting the trade effect of EIAs.
4
2.2 Pitfalls of the gravity model
Estimating equation (2) in order to recover ζijt might seem fairly simple. There are,
however, several econometric problems that have to be addressed when estimating the
gravity equation empirically.
First, and for this paper most importantly, the EIA dummy suffers from an endo-
geneity problem. This potentially biases the gravity model when standard estimation
methods are used. Contrary to what is normally assumed in empirical papers, the
EIA dummy variable is not an exogenous variable: country pairs that conclude trade
agreements are not randomly selected, but unobserved time-invariant bilateral variables
influence simultaneously the presence of an EIA and the volume of trade. This endo-
geneity problem is extremely troublesome, as there does not exist a consensus in the
literature as to the direction of the bias. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) find that unob-
served heterogeneity most likely biases the coefficients of FTAs downwards in standard
gravity equation estimations, while Magee (2003) argues that - building on the natural
trading partner hypothesis - countries tend to conclude EIAs if they already have sig-
nificant bilateral trade. This argument is consistent with Roy (2012), who finds that
most positive and significant estimates of FTAs can be explained by positive selection of
country pairs in trade agreements. The CUs in Roy’s study, however, seem to be robust
to selection on observables. If any, there is a negative selection effect of CUs.
Even though this endogeneity problem was already raised in 1993 by Trefler, Baier
and Bergstrand (2002 and 2004) and Magee (2003) were the first to address it empir-
ically - using instrumental variables with cross section data. However, due to the lack
of reliable instruments, these studies have not been very successful in solving the endo-
geneity of EIAs, providing “at best mixed evidence of isolating the effect of FTAs on
trade flows” as Baier and Bergstrand (2007) put it.
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) provide a more convincing solution to the endogeneity
problem, using panel data. Panel data are extremely useful in the presence of unobserved
time-invariant heterogeneity as it is possible to control for this unobserved heterogeneity
and hence alleviate the endogeneity bias by using either country pair fixed effects or
first differencing the data. Both solutions have since then been extensively used in
empirical work. One major drawback of these methods is that they absorb all country
pair variation of the data and it hence becomes impossible to investigate the effects of
variables that vary only along the ij-dimension. Also, Roy (2012) urges to be cautious
with this method “given the tension between the time dimension of the data and the
assumption of time-invariant unobservables”. Neither country pair fixed effects nor first
differencing the data will control for the endogeneity bias stemming from non-random
selection of country pairs into trade agreements if the unobserved variables influencing
both the presence of an EIA and trade volumes change over time.
Differencing panel data has one major advantage over using fixed effects: if the error
terms are highly serially correlated, then estimating the model in differences will be more
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efficient than fixed effects for large T (Woolridge, 2002). However, fifth differencing also
results in a loss of data as the fifth-differences estimator uses up the first five years of
data. This becomes especially problematic when adding lags to our baseline model, as
it results in additional loss of data. As we only have a time span of 26 years, we prefer
using country pair fixed effects over differences in this paper. We will however estimate
our model using differences as a robustness check.
Second, Ait and Bjt include the so-called multilateral price/resistance (MR) term
(see for example Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). There are different methods to
estimate this unobserved MR term (see Feenstra 2004). A first option is to proxy the
multilateral MR term by price index data (like GDP deflators). However, as not all
costs of making transactions across borders are reflected in aggregate price indices, this
estimation method will yield biased results.
A second option is to directly estimate the MR term. This requires solving a highly
nonlinear system of N equations with a custom nonlinear least squares program. As
this is computationally very burdensome, this is not feasible for datasets with a large
number of country pairs and years such as ours.
A third alternative is to include country-time fixed effects. Though still compu-
tationally burdensome when working with large panel datasets5, this has become the
preferred method of many authors for solving the MR problem (including Baier and
Bergstrand 2007). Again, the strength of this method is at the same time its weak-
est point: as all country-time variation of the data is absorbed, it becomes once more
impossible to investigate the effects of variables that vary only along this dimension.
Baier and Bergstrand (2009) provide a fourth alternative to control for the mul-
tilateral price/resistance term. By using a first-order Taylor expansion of the MR
term, this approach provides coefficient estimates virtually identical to the fixed ef-
fects method. Compared to the other estimation methods, bonus vetus ordinary least
squares (BVOLS), as Baier an Bergstrand call it, has two major advantages: first, it
is computationally easier than estimating the MR term directly. Second, the use of
BVOLS instead of the fixed effects specification avoids the incidental parameters prob-
lem. However, this method does not allow one to control for the endogeneity of EIAs.
Since estimating the impact of EIAs correctly is crucial for our research, we therefore
opt to use it and jt fixed effects in this paper.
Third, zero trade flows are very common in trade datasets when a global perspective
is adopted. When using a loglinearized gravity equation, these zero observations are
ignored, which can potentially bias the results. Two methods have been proposed in
the literature to cope with this zero-trade-flow problem: including a selection equation
and estimating the model multiplicatively using for example Poisson Pseudo Maximum
Likelihood (as proposed by Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). However, due to the particular
5Calculation times have luckily shortened tremendously since the introduction of the high-dimensional
fixed effects command reghdfe for Stata by Guimaraes and Portugal (2010).
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characteristics and quality of our data set, our sample does not count many zero trade
flows (less than 11% for imports and 4% for exports). The potential bias stemming
from zero trade flows is hence not a major concern. Moreover, it is computationally
impossible to estimate a model with a large number of fixed effects using PPML because
of convergence issues.
This brings us to the following baseline model
lnXijt = β0 + β1PTAijt + β2FTAijt + β3CUijt + δit + ψjt + ηij + ijt (3)
with PTAijt (FTAijt) (CUijt) a dummy variable taking the value 1 when countries i
and j have an active PTA (FTA) (CU) in year t; δit importer-time fixed effect; ψjt
exporter-time fixed effect; ηij country pair fixed effect and ijt error term.
2.3 Dissecting the effects of EIAs
Our properly specified baseline model is, however, too simple to capture the complex
trade effects of EIAs. Starting from our simple baseline model, we will therefore progres-
sively dissect the heterogeneous effects of the European Union EIAs in a more precise
manner. We hence let go of the frequently used empirical assumption of homogeneous
trade effects of EIAs (see for example Rose 2000; Feenstra, Markusen and Rose 2001
and Frankel and Rose 2002). In this paper, we dissect the complexity of the effects of
EIAs in four ways.
First of all, we are interested in the exact way trade agreements affect trade flows:
do EIAs affect how much countries trade of a given good (the intensive margin) or
rather how many goods are traded (the extensive margin)? Following Eaton, Kortum
and Kramarz (2004), we will therefore decompose our trade flows into an intensive and
an extensive margin, using highly disaggregated data.
Second, EIAs could also have very different effects depending on how long they
have already been in place. EIAs are typically phased in over a period of five to ten
years6, and terms-of-trade changes take typically a few years before coming into effect,
altering the effect of EIAs over time. Following Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and Baier,
Bergstrand and Feng (2014), we include 5- and 10-year lags of our set of EIA variables
in our estimation in order to pick up on these reaction effects.
Magee (2008) goes a step further, and includes a separate dummy per year that an
EIA has entered into force. This makes it possible to evaluate how the effects of EIAs
change over time. Including this many dummy variables in a model, however, raises the
question of multicollinearity since it is very probable that several of these variables will
be highly correlated.
6Du¨r et al. (2014) coded 587 agreements signed between 1945 and 2009 and find that it takes on
average 5.7 years for the tariff cuts of an FTA to be fully implemented and 4.5 years for a CU. Partial
trade agreements have a relatively short so-called “transition period” of just 1.7 years.
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Furthermore, several papers have provided some indication that EIAs not only have
(lagged) reaction effects, but that there might also be an anticipation effect (these include
Magee 2008; Freund and McLaren 1999; Mo¨lders and Volz 2011 and Florensa, Ma´rquez-
Ramos and Recalde 2015). EIAs are typically negotiated for many years and several
years might pass by between the signing of an agreement and its entering into force.
It is thus not unthinkable that agents already anticipate the entering into force of an
EIA. Anticipation effects and endogeneity issues are however closely related (and both
are often mixed up). This is why we will deal with anticipation effects in the robustness
check.
Third, we take the dissection of the European EIAs even further and look at the
effects of each FTA and CU separately. We do this by swapping the FTA and CU
dummies with a separate dummy for each agreement (the agreements included are listed
in table 2).
Finally, and pushing the dissecting of the EIAs even further, we have a closer look
at the effects of the EU EIAs on each EU country individually. EU EIAs are negotiated
by the European Union, but most likely will not have a similar impact on all member
states. The 27 economies of the European Union differ considerably and EIAs can have
very different economic effects, depending on the characteristics of the signatories. We
will therefore estimate our baseline model for the EU countries individually.
Following Herderschee and Qiao (2007), we do this by creating three sets of interac-
tion terms with on the one hand our EIA dummies and on the other hand a dummy for
the country for which we estimate the individual effect. Our fixed effects specification
then becomes
lnXijt = β0 + β1PTAijt ∗ Ij + β2FTAijt ∗ Ij + β3CUijt ∗ Ij + δit + ψjt + ηij + ijt (4)
with Ij an indicator variable for country j.
3 Data
The data used in this paper cover bilateral import and export flows between the 27
member states of the European Union and the rest of the world (203 countries and
territories) from 1988 through 2013. Table 1 lists the countries included in our dataset.
We have two main datasets. Data on bilateral trade flows come from the Eurostat
database COMEXT. We opted for this database as it contains the most detailed and
complete information on trade between the European Union and the rest of the world:
both extra-EU imports and exports are available on the eight-digit level from 1988 to
2013 for a large number of countries7. Hence the panel has a maximum of 203∗26∗26 =
7The COMEXT database considers Belgium and Luxemburg, and Liechtenstein and Switzerland as
one country. So when we refer to Belgium or Switzerland in this paper, we really mean Belgium and
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137 228 observations, of which 92 517 (67%) are non-missing.
For our dataset on trade agreements, we constructed a multichotomous index of
EIAs. We used the same EIA classification as Baier and Bergstrand (based upon Frankel
1997 and Balassa 1987), but since the European Union did not conclude any economic
union agreements with third countries and because of the small number of two-way
preferential trade agreements, we compiled the Baier and Bergstrand index into three
categories: (1) one-way and two-way preferential trade agreement (PTA), (2) free trade
agreement (FTA) and (3) customs union and common market (CU). Data on FTAs
and CUs were collected from McGill (2014), Tuck (2014), WorldTradeLaw.net (2012),
WTO (2014), EFTA (2014) and European Commission (2014). When data on entry
into force of agreements differed between sources, we used the data provided by the
European Commission. Table 2 lists all the European Union free trade agreements and
customs unions with third countries. For data on PTAs, we used Regulations of the
EU Council concerning GSP schemes and European Commission (2014) as our main
sources. Summary statistics on EIAs are provided in table 3.
Luxemburg, and Switzerland and Liechtenstein. Moreover, we do not include Croatia in our sample, as
Croatia became a member of the EU in mid 2013.
Table 1: List of partner countries in dataset
Afghanistan, Albania, Antarctica, Algeria, American Samoa, Andorra, Angola, Antigua Barbuda, Azerbaijan,
Argentina, Australia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Armenia, Barbados, Bermuda, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia
Herzegovina, Botswana, Bouvet Island, Brazil, Belize, British Indian OT, Solomon Islands, Br Virgin Islands,
Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar, Burundi, Belarus, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cabo Verde, Cayman Islands,
Central African Rep, Sri Lanka, Chad, Chile, China, Taiwan, Christmas Island, Cocos Islands, Colombia, Co-
moros, Mayotte, Congo, DR Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba, Benin, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Faroe Islands, Falkland Islands, S Georgia and Sand-
wich Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, French ST, Djibouti, Gabon, Georgia, Gambia, Palestine, Ghana, Gibraltar,
Kiribati, Greenland, Grenada, Guam, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Heard and McDonald Islands, Holy
See (Vatican), Honduras, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Cte d’Ivoire, Jamaica, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Jordan, Kenya, North-Korea, Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya,
Macao, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Moldova,
Montenegro, Montserrat, Morocco, Mozambique, Oman, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherland Antilles, Aruba,
New Caledonia, Vanuatu, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Norfolk Island, Norway, Northern Mar-
iana Islands, United States Minor Outlying Islands, Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Palau, Pakistan, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Pitcairn, Guinea-Bissau, Timor-Leste, Qatar, Russian Federa-
tion, Rwanda, St Helena, Ascension and Tristan, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Anguilla, Saint Lucia, Saint Pierre and
Miquelon, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia,
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Viet Nam, Somalia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland,
Switzerland-Liechtenstein, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tokelau, Tonga, Trinidad and To-
bago, United Arab Emirates, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Turks and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine,
former Yugoslav rep Macedonia, E.ypt, Tanzania, United States, Virgin Islands U.S., Burkina Faso, Uruguay,
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Wallis and Futuna, Samoa, Yemen, Zambia
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Table 2: Trade Agreements in force between the EU and third countries for the period
1988-2013. The labels in parentheses refer to the EU classification of the agreement.
Date Agreement Type Date Agreement Type
1971 EU-OCT FTA (ASS) 2004 EU-Montenegro FTA (SAA)
1973 EU-Liechtenstein FTA (FTA) 2005 EU-Algeria FTA (ASS)
1973 EU-Switzerland FTA (FTA) 2006 EU-Albania FTA (SAA)
1973 EU-Iceland FTA (FTA) 2008 EU-Bosnia-Herzegovina FTA (SAA)
1973 EU-Norway FTA (FTA) 2009 EU-Swaziland FTA (EPA)
1991 EU-Andorra CU (CU) 2009 EU-Namibia FTA (EPA)
1994 EU-Liechtenstein CM (CM) 2009 EU-Lesotho FTA (EPA)
1994 EU-Iceland CM (CM) 2009 EU-Botswana FTA (EPA)
1994 EU-Norway CM (CM) 2009 EU-Cameroon FTA (EPA)
1995 EU-Israel FTA (ASS) 2009 EU-Zimbabwe FTA (EPA)
1996 EU-Turkey CU (CU) 2009 EU-Mauritius FTA (EPA)
1997 EU-Faeroe Islands FTA (FTA) 2009 EU-Seychelles FTA (EPA)
1997 EU-Palestine FTA (ASS) 2009 EU-Madagascar FTA (EPA)
1998 EU-Tunisia FTA (ASS) 2009 EU-Mozambique FTA (EPA)
2000 EU-South Africa FTA (ASS) 2009 EU-CARIFORUM FTA (EPA)
2000 EU-Morocco FTA (ASS) 2010 EU-Serbia FTA (SAA)
2000 EU-Mexico FTA (FTA) 2011 EU-South-Korea FTA (NFTA)
2001 EU-Macedonia FTA (SAA) 2011 EU-Papua New Guinea FTA (EPA)
2002 EU-Jordan FTA (ASS) 2013 EU-Nicaragua FTA (ASS)
2002 EU-San Marino CU (CU) 2013 EU-Panama FTA (ASS)
2003 EU-Lebanon FTA (ASS) 2013 EU-Colombia FTA (FTA)
2003 EU-Chile FTA (FTA) 2013 EU-Peru FTA (FTA)
2004 EU-Egypt FTA (ASS) 2013 EU-Honduras FTA (ASS)
Date refers to the (provisional) entry into force of an agreement. EPA: Economic Partnership
Agreement, FTA: Free trade agreement, NFTA: New Generation FTA, ASS: Association Agreement,
SAA: Stabilisation and Association Agreement, CU: Customs Union, CM: Common Market.
Table 3: Summary statistics on EIAs.
EIA Number Percentage Share of EIAs
No EIA 54 926 40.0%
One-way PTA 64 508 47.0% 78.4%
Two-way PTA 2 782 2.0% 3.3%
FTA 13 158 9.6% 15.9%
CU 1 854 1.4% 2.3%
Total 137 228 100%
4 Results
Section 4.1 presents our main results. We start by estimating the most simple form of
our baseline model in section 4.1.1, and then gradually disentangle the effects of the EU
EIAs. First, we look at the impact of allowing for differential timing of EIAs (section
4.1.2) and the effects on the margins (section 4.1.3). Section 4.1.4 pushes the dissection
of the EIAs further and estimates the effect of each EIA separately. Finally, section
4.1.5 looks at the effects on EU member states individually.
Section 4.2 presents robustness checks and extensions. Section 4.2.1 discusses strict
endogeneity and anticipation effects, and estimates the baseline model using differencing




Table 4 represents estimates of the effects of different types of EIAs on imports and
exports respectively, based on equation (3). We ran all our regressions twice - once using
bilateral import data and once using bilateral export data - as there is no reason for
import and export flows to be symmetric. This is especially important when analyzing
EIAs, as many trade agreements have very different stipulations for imports compared
to exports. As the Breusch-Pagan test and the Wooldrigde test indicate the presence
of severe heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the data, respectively, we employ
standard errors that are clustered by country pair.
First of all, note that the European Union only has three customs unions with third
countries (Andorra, Turkey and San Marino) and three common market agreements
(Liechtenstein8, Norway and Iceland). Results for the CU dummies will therefore mainly
be driven by Turkey, Norway and Iceland, and will have large standard errors due to
the small sample size.
Looking at the first column of table 4, we see that CUs and FTAs have a bigger effect
on trade flows than PTAs. This is consistent with Baier, Bergstrand and Feng (2014),
who also find that deeper integration results in larger effects. This holds up for the
import-side as well as the export-side. We see that PTAs have a negative effect on both
imports and exports: PTAs reduce trade flows from third countries to the EU on average
with e(−0.26)−1 = −23%, while trade flows from the EU to third countries drop by 16%
on average. This is surprising, as the goal of most PTAs is to increase imports from
(poor) third countries to the EU. However, there is some evidence that exports eligible
for preferential treatment do not always enter the EU market at a preferential rate,
due to for example complex rules of origin procedures (see for example Manchin (2006)
for a discussion of the preference utilisation rate of ACP countries). This unexploited
potential of PTAs might explain why they have not succeeded in raising imports to the
EU.
We see a different picture looking at the estimates for FTAs. These trade agreements
do not have a statistically significant effect on imports, but do increase exports by 22%
8We ignore the common market agreement between Liechtenstein and the EU, as Liechtenstein and
Switzerland are considered one country in our dataset.
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on average. This suggests that the European Union leads a successful trade policy
and succeeds in concluding strategic trade agreements that boost exports of EU firms,
while at the same time not increasing increasing imports (and thus competition) to the
European Union market. The EU succeeds in achieving the main goal of its trade policy:
improving market access for its exporters.
In contrast to Baier, Bergstrand and Feng (2014), we do not find a larger effect of CUs
on trade than FTAs. CUs have no statistically significant impact on imports or exports,
though the coefficients are positive for both. There are two possible explanations for this.
First of all, CUs might have an effect on trade, but fail to reach statistical significance
due to the small number of CUs in our sample. Alternatively, EU CUs might simply not
have (large) effects on trade flows. We find support for this explanation in two variables
that look at the design of trade agreements. The first one describes the depth of EIAs
and is provided by Du¨r et al. (2014)9. The second one describes the enforcability of
EIAs and is provided by Kohl, Brakman and Garretsen (2015)10. Comparing the FTAs
and CUs in our sample, we see that our CUs are less enforcable and not as deep as our
FTAs11.
4.1.2 Differential timing of EIAs
In column (2) and (3) of table 4, we added 5- and 10-year lags to the specifications12.
Again like Baier, Bergstrand and Feng (2014), we see that trade agreements continue
having effects on trade flows 5 or 10 years after the EIA has entered into force. As
mentioned before, this is because of two reasons. First, many stipulations of trade
agreements only enter into force after a certain period of time, since EIAs are typically
phased-in over a period of five to ten years. Second, it takes time for the terms of trade
to adjust to the new situation.
Taking a closer look, we see that PTAs have a contemporaneous effect on imports,
as well as a 5-year lagged effect. The coefficient for the 10-year lag is not statistically
significant. We find no lagged effects of PTAs on the export side. Similar to the
9Available in the DESTA database on http://www.designoftradeagreements.org/.
10Available on http://www.tristankohl.org/datasets.
11More specifically, the FTAs in our sample score on average 0.68 on enforcability and 3.6 on depth,
while CUs score 0.5 and 1.8 (with lower scores indicating a more shallow and less enforcable EIA). For
more info on these variables, see the respective websites. Sadly, both datasets only coded a little more
than half of the FTAs in our sample.
12Note that when adding 5- and 10-year lags, only agreements enforced by 2008 or 2003 are considered.
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Table 4: GLS estimation of the baseline model using fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3)
Import X IM EM X IM EM X IM EM
PTA -0.26***-0.28*** 0.02 -0.24***-0.26*** 0.01 -0.21** -0.21** -0.01
(0.093) (0.088) (0.036) (0.092) (0.086) (0.036) (0.096) (0.089) (0.039)
Lag 5 -0.22***-0.26*** 0.04* -0.20***-0.23*** 0.02
(0.066) (0.064) (0.023) (0.076) (0.073) (0.026)
Lag 10 -0.12 -0.10 -0.02
(0.082) (0.082) (0.026)
FTA -0.14 -0.13 -0.00 -0.12 -0.12 -0.00 -0.14 -0.13 -0.01
(0.121) (0.115) (0.049) (0.121) (0.115) (0.049) (0.137) (0.133) (0.054)
Lag 5 -0.10 -0.23** 0.13*** -0.06 -0.15 0.09**
(0.097) (0.099) (0.036) (0.108) (0.111) (0.039)
Lag 10 -0.12 -0.16 0.03
(0.118) (0.123) (0.038)
CU 0.09 -0.16 0.25*** 0.06 -0.19 0.25*** 0.08 -0.17 0.26***
(0.184) (0.169) (0.080) (0.182) (0.167) (0.079) (0.212) (0.180) (0.092)
Lag 5 -0.05 -0.09 0.04 -0.08 -0.06 -0.01
(0.130) (0.122) (0.051) (0.144) (0.133) (0.057)
Lag 10 -0.24 -0.18 -0.06
(0.185) (0.179) (0.065)
Total ATE PTA -0.54***-0.53*** -0.00
(0.166) (0.158) (0.062)
FTA -0.32 -0.44 0.12
(0.282) (0.290) (0.104)
CU -0.23 -0.42 0.19
(0.400) (0.349) (0.169)
Export
PTA -0.17** -0.14** -0.02 -0.17** -0.15** -0.03 -0.10 -0.07 -0.03
(0.072) (0.071) (0.038) (0.071) (0.070) (0.037) (0.080) (0.080) (0.041)
Lag 5 0.08 0.03 0.06** 0.08 0.03 0.05*
(0.051) (0.046) (0.024) (0.061) (0.055) (0.027)
Lag 10 0.10* 0.09* 0.01
(0.057) (0.051) (0.027)
FTA 0.20** 0.23*** -0.03 0.20** 0.24*** -0.03 0.26** 0.28*** -0.03
(0.093) (0.088) (0.052) (0.093) (0.088) (0.052) (0.109) (0.101) (0.059)
Lag 5 0.13* 0.04 0.09** 0.16* 0.09 0.07*
(0.075) (0.065) (0.041) (0.082) (0.072) (0.041)
Lag 10 0.07 0.01 0.06
(0.092) (0.079) (0.043)
CU 0.19 0.01 0.18** 0.19 0.01 0.18** 0.25 0.09 0.16*
(0.146) (0.140) (0.079) (0.145) (0.139) (0.078) (0.161) (0.165) (0.087)
Lag 5 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.11 -0.00
(0.099) (0.093) (0.052) (0.109) (0.107) (0.056)
Lag 10 0.06 0.13 -0.07
(0.147) (0.138) (0.069)
Total ATE PTA 0.08 0.06 0.03
(0.133) (0.130) (0.067)
FTA 0.48** 0.38** 0.10
(0.217) (0.191) (0.111)
CU 0.42 0.34 0.09
(0.301) (0.303) (0.163)
Fixed effects
Country-year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Pair yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs import 82661 82661 82661 73808 73808 73808 60638 60638 60638
Obs export 88803 88803 88803 79375 79375 79375 65473 65473 65473
Standard errors clustered on country pair in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Total average treatment effects (ATEs) are computed using a two-tailed joint significance test.
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contemporaneous effects of FTAs and CUs, these deeper EIAs have no lagged effects on
imports. FTAs do however have a lagged effect on export flows.
We also included 15-year lags in our estimation, but the coefficients for the different
EIAs were not statistically significant and close to zero13. This is in line with results of
Baier, Bergstrand and Feng (2014) and Florensa, Ma´rquez-Ramos and Recalde (2015)
amongst others.
In order to see the cumulative effects of EIAs over time, we calculated total average
treatment effects (ATEs) using a two-tailed joint significance test14. We find that PTAs
have strong and persistent negative treatment effects on imports (-42%), while FTAs
have strong positive treatment effects on exports (+62%). All other EIAs have no
(statistically significant) effects on trade flows in the long run.
We elaborate further on the differential timing of EIAs on the margins of trade in
the next section.
4.1.3 Opposing effects on margins of trade
Each set in table 4 presents the results of running the same specification with three
alternative dependent variables: bilateral import or export flows (X or lnXijt in equation
(3)), the intensive margin (IM) and the extensive margin (EM).
We find that the contemporaneous effects for PTAs and FTAs are completely driven
by the intensive margin. Looking at the lagged effects on the margins, we see that PTAs
and FTAs have positive lagged effects on the extensive margin (for PTAs this is only on
the export-side, while for FTAs this is true for both imports and exports). This is in line
with the theoretical predictions of Ruhl (2008) and Arkolakis, Eaton and Kortum (2011)
who argue that effects on the extensive margin are delayed due to fixed export costs and
delayed consumer responses respectively. Changes in volume, however, do not require
any start-up costs or changes in customer behavior. This is also confirmed empirically
by Baier, Bergstrand and Feng (2014), who find that intensive margin effects of EIAs
occur sooner than extensive margin effects.
This is in contrast to the effects of CUs, which are mainly driven by the extensive
margin. This, along with the lack of lagged effects of CUs, can be explained by the
13Results have been omitted in order to save space, but can be retrieved upon request to the authors.
14This in contrast to Baier, Bergstrand and Feng (2014) who simply take the sum of the coefficients
that are statistically significant.
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particular structure of our data. As mentioned, results for CUs are mainly driven by
Turkey, Norway and Iceland. All of these countries already had very close economic
ties with the EU before concluding a CU with the EU15. This probably sped up the
adjustment of the terms of trade, as economic structures were already in place.
Furthermore, we also find that zero effects of EIAs on total trade flows are sometimes
caused by opposing effects on the margins. This is for example the case for CUs on the
import-side. The positive contemporaneous effects on the extensive margin are offset by
a negative effect on the intensive margin.
4.1.4 Effects of individual EIAs
We now look at the different European Union EIAs separately. How does each FTA and
CU influence trade flows between the EU27 and the rest of the world? For this, we swap
the FTA and CU dummy in equation (3) by a separate dummy for each agreement.
Note that we cannot estimate the individual effects of the agreements with Papua,
CARIFORUM, Cameroon, Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Botswana,
Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, Mozambique, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Switzerland, South-Korea, Colombia, Peru, Honduras, Panama and Nicaragua
because of collinearity. Most of these agreements only entered into force in the last
year(s) of our sample, or are concluded with countries that have poor data availability.
Therefore we group them together in a control variable. This control variable also ab-
sorbs all other EIAs that are not captured by the separate agreement dummies (namely
PTAs and EIAs that were in place between third countries and EU countries, before
they were part of the EU27).
The results are summarized in figure 1. The full regression output can be found
in table 9 in the appendix. We see that the effects of the different FTAs and CUs
between the EU27 and the rest of the world are very heterogeneous. Moreover, we see
that many trade agreements have zero effect on trade: most trade agreements have no
statistically significant effect on trade flows. Only 6 trade agreements have positive
effects on imports and exports, while the trade agreement with Albania has negative
and statistically significant effects on both imports and exports.
15Norway and Iceland had an FTA with the EU before entering into a CU, while Turkey signed the
Ankara Agreements in 1963, initiating a three-step process towards creating a CU which would help
secure Turkey’s full membership in the EEC.
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Figure 1: Contemporaneous effects16(in %) of individual EIAs on imports (top) and
exports (bottom) using a GLS estimation with fixed effects. The percentage next to
each bar indicates the share of each country in total extra-EU imports.
Note: The stars next to the agreements indicate statistical significance of the estimate for the total trade flow
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Only estimates for the margins which are statistically significant at the 10%
treshold are shown in the graph. The full regression output can be found in table 9 in the appendix.
This is similar to Kohl (2014), who finds that of the 166 trade agreements in his
sample, 64% have no statistically significant total treatment effect on trade flows. 27%
have trade promoting effects and 10% have negative total treatment effects.
When we look at the margins, however, we see a different picture. The lack of
significant effects of trade agreements on trade flows is partly explained by opposing
effects on the intensive and extensive margin. For 7 (9) trade agreements, the positive
effect on the extensive margin of imports (exports) is (partly) offset by negative effects on
the intensive margin, while for 3 trade agreements, the negative effect on the extensive
margin of imports and exports are (partly) offset by positive effects on the intensive




4.1.5 Effects of EIAs on individual countries
Finally, we relax the assumption that trade agreements have a homogeneous impact on
the countries that sign them and estimate the effects of PTAs, FTAs and CUs on each
EU27 country separately. EIAs with European Union countries are negotiated by the
European Union, but will most likely not have a similar impact on all member states.
The 27 economies of the European Union differ considerably in terms of GDP, distance to
third countries, sharing a common language with third countries, trade openness17, and
so on. EIAs can have very different economic effects, depending on the characteristics of
the signatories (see for example Vicard (2009) for a study showing empirically that the
effectiveness of an EIA in enhancing bilateral trade flows depends on both the economic
characteristics of the country pair and the characteristics of all other members of the
EIA).
Results are presented in figure 2. As expected, we find that EIAs have a heteroge-
neous impact on the different European Union countries. We see that for most EU27
countries, PTAs have no total treatment effects on total import or export flows. PTAs
have strong negative and statistically significant effects on the imports of Belgium, Slo-
vakia, Austria and Hungary, while they have a positive and statistically significant effect
on the exports of Latvia and a small negative and statistically significant effect on the
exports of Estonia and Greece.
FTAs have a negative and statistically significant effect on the imports of France,
Italy, Belgium, Portugal, Ireland, the Netherlands, Finland and Cyprus, while they have
a positive and statistically significant effect on the imports of Slovenia and Cyprus, and
the exports of France, Spain, Italy, Greece and Slovakia. For CUs, we find positive
effects on the imports of Slovenia and Cyprus, and negative effects on the imports of
Spain, Sweden, Greece, UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Germany, France and
Portugal. We also find large positive and statistically significant effects on the exports
of Latvia, the Netherlands and Lithuania.
Again, we find quite some contrasting effects on the margins. Slovakia, Hungary,
17Arribas, Perez and Tortosa-Ausina (2011) for example show that there are very large differences in
trade openness across the members of the European Union, with Belgium, Luxembourg, Czech Republic,
Hungary, The Netherlands and Slovakia the most open countries, and Spain, the UK and especially
Greece the least open.
17
Figure 2: Total average treatment effects (ATEs) of EIAs (in %) on imports (left) and
exports (right) of individual EU countries using a GLS estimation with fixed effects.
(a) Effects of PTAs.
(b) Effects of FTAs.
(c) Effects of CUs.
Note: The stars next to the agreements indicate statistical significance of the estimate for the total trade flow
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Only estimates for the margins which are statistically significant at the 10%
threshold are shown in the graph. The full regression output can be retrieved upon request to the authors.
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Romania and the Czech Republic for example experience a positive and statistically
significant effect of FTAs on the extensive margin. However, the effect on total trade
flows fails to reach statistical significance, indicating an effect on the intensive margin
with a different sign.
Finally, we see that EIAs have less statistically significant effects on EU countries
on the export-side than on the import-side. However, the effects of EIAs on exports are
larger and more often positive than on imports.
4.2 Robustness checks and extensions
4.2.1 Strict exogeneity and anticipation effects
Generalised least squares (GLS) assumes strict exogeneity. If this assumption fails, the
estimation will be biased. To test for strict exogeneity, Woolridge (2010) suggests in-
cluding leads of the EIA variables in levels in the fixed effects and differences estimation.
If the EIA variables are endogenous, then the leads will be significant and results for the
fixed effects specification and differences specification will be different, since a violation
of the strict exogeneity assumption will bias both estimators in a different way.
Results for the exogeneity test are presented in table 5. We computed the test with
5-year leads as well as with 1-year leads. We can see that PTAs and CUs are strictly
exogenous on the import-side. However, the assumption of strict exogeneity is violated
for FTAs on the import-side when using the fixed effects specification and including 5-
year leads as well as when using the differences specification and including 1-year leads.
On the export side, FTAs and CUs are strictly exogenous, but we now find a violation
of the strict exogeneity assumption of the PTA dummy.
In order to assess how much our results are biased due to these violations of the
strict exogeneity assumption, and also as a robustness check, we compute our extended
baseline model using differences. Taking the fifth difference18 of equation (3) eliminates
the country pair fixed effects
∆5lnXijt = β0 + β1∆5PTAijt + β2∆5FTAijt + β3∆5CUijt + ∆5δit + ∆5ψjt + ijt (5)
18Following Baier, Bergstrand and Feng (2014), we use fifth differences instead of first differences as
trade flows typically change very slowly over time, making it very likely that first differenced data will
not display much of variation.
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with ∆5 fifth difference.
Comparing the coefficients for the baseline model obtained using the fixed effects
specification in table 4 with the baseline model obtained using the differences specifica-
tion in table 6, we see that the results are very similar. This similarity also holds up for
the coefficients of FTAs on the import-side and PTAs on the export-side. This suggests
that the bias coming from endogeneity of FTAs on the import-side and PTAs on the
export-side is not that important.
Moreover, differencing panel data has one major advantage over using fixed effects:
it allows us to look at anticipation effects. When using differences, we can distinguish
between anticipation effects and endogeneity; when testing endogeneity we include leads
of the EIA variables in levels, while for anticipation effects, we include leads of the EIA
varables in differences19. This is not possible when using our fixed effects specification.
Results are also presented in table 6. We find large negative and statistically signif-
19Florensa, Ma´rquez-Ramos and Recalde (2015) do not make this distinction.
Table 5: Exogeneity test using both a GLS estimation with fixed effects and differences.
Imports Exports
Fixed effects Differences Fixed effects Differences
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
PTA -0.28***-0.24** -0.06 -0.04
L5.PTA 0.02 -0.19** 0.11 0.08
L10.PTA -0.33***-0.18** 0.10 0.10*
FTA -0.30** -0.13 0.23*0.37***
L5.FTA -0.22 -0.10 0.10 0.15*
L10.FTA -0.08 -0.13 0.01 0.07
CU -0.05 0.11 0.14 0.36*
L5.CU -0.48** -0.11 -0.04 0.07
L10.CU -0.15 -0.21 -0.21 -0.02
∆5PTA -0.31***-0.18* -0.20** -0.16**
∆5FTA -0.26* -0.18 0.19* 0.21**
∆5CU -0.05 0.04 0.25 0.31**
F5.PTA -0.15 0.34 -0.13 -0.07
F5.FTA -0.41* -0.84 -0.04 0.20
F5.CU -0.43 0.05 0.09 -0.03
F.PTA 0.00 0.27 -0.08 0.37*
F.FTA -0.05 0.49* -0.17 -0.29
F.CU -0.04 0.71 -0.20 -0.29
Fixed effects
Country-year yes yes no no yes yes no no
Pair yes yes no no yes yes no no
∆5country-year no no yes yes no no yes yes
Observations 40112 56512 38488 53510 42714 60888 42379 59386
Standard errors clustered on country pair in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
When we include lags in our differences specification, only a little more than 17 000 (22 000)
observations remain on the import-side (export-side). This is only 22% (25%) of our sample.
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Table 6: Estimation of the baseline model with lags and leads using differences.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Import X IM EM X IM EM X IM EM X IM EM
F5.∆5PTA -0.41* -0.48** 0.08
(0.226) (0.222) (0.086)
∆5PTA -0.16* -0.16* 0.01 -0.21** -0.23** 0.01 -0.25** -0.24** -0.01 -0.37***-0.40∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.094) (0.088)(0.037) (0.096) (0.090) (0.039) (0.108) (0.102) (0.044) (0.099) (0.093) (0.040)
L5.∆5PTA -0.16** -0.17** 0.01 -0.26***-0.26*** 0.00
(0.068) (0.067) (0.022) (0.085) (0.083) (0.029)
L10.∆5PTA -0.21** -0.20** -0.02
(0.089) (0.090) (0.029)
F5.∆5FTA -0.58* -0.66∗∗ 0.08
(0.299) (0.283) (0.106)
∆5FTA -0.14 -0.07 -0.07 -0.15 -0.13 -0.02 -0.11 -0.07 -0.04 -0.35** -0.31∗∗ -0.04
(0.117) (0.113)(0.047) (0.133) (0.131) (0.053) (0.167) (0.169) (0.065) (0.141) (0.138) (0.054)
L5.∆5FTA -0.04 -0.15 0.11*** 0.01 -0.08 0.08
(0.103) (0.104) (0.036) (0.150) (0.151) (0.051)
L10.∆5FTA -0.02 -0.02 0.00
(0.137) (0.140) (0.042)
F5.∆5CU -0.76 -1.06∗∗∗ 0.30
(0.497) (0.407) (0.201)
∆5CU 0.10 -0.10 0.20** 0.08 -0.13 0.21** 0.21 -0.02 0.23** -0.16 -0.40∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.176)(0.081) (0.207) (0.183) (0.085) (0.266) (0.219) (0.110) (0.212) (0.199) (0.083)
L5.∆5CU 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.02
(0.147) (0.139) (0.052) (0.203) (0.185) (0.078)
L10.∆5CU -0.00 0.04 -0.04
(0.227) (0.210) (0.092)
Export
F5.∆5PTA -0.32 -0.29 -0.03
(0.194) (0.183) (0.084)
∆5PTA -0.15** -0.12* -0.03 -0.12 -0.10 -0.02 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.23***-0.23*** -0.00
(0.075) (0.072)(0.037) (0.075) (0.073) (0.039) (0.087) (0.085) (0.045) (0.087) (0.083) (0.043)
L5.∆5PTA 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.14** 0.09 0.05*
(0.050) (0.046) (0.023) (0.065) (0.058) (0.030)
L10.∆5PTA 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.01
(0.060) (0.055) (0.030)
F5.∆5FTA 0.21 0.04 0.17*
(0.218) (0.202) (0.102)
∆5FTA 0.19** 0.25*** -0.06 0.27***0.29*** -0.02 0.30*** 0.31*** -0.02 0.21** 0.22** -0.00
(0.088) (0.084)(0.049) (0.094) (0.088) (0.055) (0.113) (0.104) (0.066) (0.105) (0.102) (0.058)
L5.∆5FTA 0.17** 0.10 0.07* 0.18* 0.09 0.09*
(0.074) (0.066) (0.041) (0.101) (0.088) (0.053)
L10.∆5FTA 0.08 0.03 0.05
(0.097) (0.083) (0.048)
F5.∆5CU 0.25 -0.08 0.33
(0.369) (0.318) (0.214)
∆5CU 0.21 0.07 0.14* 0.26* 0.11 0.16* 0.39** 0.20 0.19 0.19 -0.02 0.20**
(0.146) (0.142)(0.081) (0.146) (0.141) (0.086) (0.175) (0.173) (0.114) (0.175) (0.165) (0.088)
L5.∆5CU 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.16 0.13 0.03
(0.106) (0.102) (0.053) (0.142) (0.138) (0.079)
L10.∆5CU 0.12 0.14 -0.02
(0.184) (0.166) (0.096)
Fixed effects
∆5country-year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Pair no no no no no no no no no no no no
Obs import 57325 57325 57325 48890 48890 48890 36671 36671 36671 38488 38488 38488
Obs export 63718 63718 63718 54416 54416 54416 40833 40833 40833 42379 42379 42379
Standard errors clustered on country pair in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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icant anticipation effects for PTAs for both imports and exports, as well as for FTAs
on the import-side. These anticipation effects are completely driven by the intensive
margin. The number of goods traded thus decreases five years leading up to a trade
agreement entering into force. This is not the case for FTAs and CUs on the export
side. Here we see positive, but not statistically significant anticipation effects. Hence,
EU exporters do not delay trade until the trade agreements enters into force.
4.2.2 Extensions
The EU has many different motives for concluding EIAs, some more economically in-
spired, while others more politically inspired. These different motivations are reflected
in the names of the different agreements: we distinguish between Generalised Scheme of
Preferences (GSP), Economic Partnership Agreements, GSP+, Everything but Arms,
Free Trade Agreements, New Generation Free Trade Agreements, Stabilisation and As-
sociation Agreements, Association Agreements, Customs Unions and Economic Market
Agreements.
In order to check if this distinction also leaves a mark in the data, we collapse these
different agreements into 6 categories. We then run our extended baseline model while
swapping the PTA, FTA and CU dummies in equation (3) for this “EU classification”
in addition to a control variable that absorbs all EIAs that are not captured by these
dummies. Results can be found in table 7.
We find that the negative effects of PTAs on imports are mainly driven by GSP+ and
Everything but Arms, and less by the regular GSP scheme and Economic Partnership
Agreements. We also find strong contemporaneous positive effects of the Stabilisation
and Association Agreements on imports, but these are offset in the long-run by strong
negative lagged effects. Association Agreements and CUs have no statistically significant
effect on imports. On the export-side, we find again that the negative contemporane-
ous effects of PTAs are mainly driven by GSP+ and Everything but Arms. When also
taking lagged effects into account, neither GSP+ and Everything but Arms nor GSP
and EPAs have a significant total effect on exports. Furthermore, we find a negative
contemporaneous effect of Stabilisation and Association Agreements on exports, but
this is offset by postitive lagged effects, resulting in a positive total ATE on exports.
Association Agreements and Customs Unions have positive contemporaneous effects on
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Table 7: GLS estimation of a variation of the baseline model using fixed effects.
Import Export
(1) (2) (1) (2)
X IM EM X IM EM X IM EM X IM EM
GSP 0.05 -0.07 0.12*** 0.08 -0.00 0.08 -0.06 -0.15* 0.09* -0.00 -0.05 0.05
(0.110) (0.105) (0.044) (0.117) (0.109) (0.049) (0.089) (0.088) (0.046)(0.099)(0.101)(0.052)
Lag 5 -0.23** -0.26*** 0.03 0.05 -0.00 0.05
(0.092) (0.088) (0.032) (0.078)(0.070)(0.033)
Lag 10 -0.18** -0.15 -0.03 0.12* 0.13** -0.02
(0.090) (0.092) (0.028) (0.062)(0.057)(0.030)
PLUS -0.52***-0.50*** -0.02 -0.36***-0.33*** -0.03 -0.22** -0.20** -0.02 -0.08 -0.10 0.01
(0.131) (0.124) (0.052) (0.138) (0.126) (0.057) (0.101) (0.100) (0.052)(0.110)(0.110)(0.058)
Lag 5 -0.38***-0.43*** 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.05
(0.111) (0.108) (0.037) (0.088)(0.079)(0.038)
Lag 10 -0.06 -0.11 0.05 0.21** 0.13 0.08*
(0.133) (0.135) (0.046) (0.092)(0.080)(0.046)
FTA 0.60* 0.45 0.15 0.65** 0.62** 0.03 0.40* 0.26 0.14 0.49** 0.48** 0.01
(0.320) (0.297) (0.106) (0.281) (0.260) (0.094) (0.212) (0.215) (0.106)(0.235)(0.231)(0.090)
Lag 5 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.02 0.11*
(0.170) (0.172) (0.053) (0.123)(0.119)(0.060)
Lag 10 -0.39** -0.29* -0.10* 0.01 0.10 -0.09*
(0.155) (0.156) (0.051) (0.116)(0.116)(0.048)
SAA 0.84** 0.49* 0.35*** 0.60** 0.35 0.26*** -0.30* -0.62***0.32*** -0.14 -0.36** 0.22**
(0.335) (0.254) (0.120) (0.297) (0.253) (0.095) (0.173) (0.150) (0.111)(0.208)(0.183)(0.090)
Lag 5 -0.51***-0.46*** -0.05 0.10 0.13 -0.04
(0.175) (0.170) (0.078) (0.176)(0.132)(0.083)
Lag 10 -0.94*** -0.65** -0.28** 0.31 0.52 -0.21
(0.311) (0.320) (0.139) (0.370)(0.330)(0.141)
ASS -0.08 -0.14 0.06 -0.09 -0.14 0.05 0.25* 0.19 0.06 0.34** 0.27* 0.06
(0.191) (0.182) (0.076) (0.212) (0.203) (0.086) (0.144) (0.135) (0.081)(0.166)(0.156)(0.092)
Lag 5 -0.22 -0.37** 0.15*** 0.03 -0.03 0.07
(0.167) (0.171) (0.058) (0.129)(0.111)(0.059)
Lag 10 -0.16 -0.25 0.09 0.26* 0.15 0.11
(0.225) (0.233) (0.069) (0.152)(0.130)(0.073)
CU 0.19 -0.09 0.28*** 0.22 -0.08 0.30*** 0.18 -0.02 0.20** 0.28* 0.08 0.20**
(0.196) (0.178) (0.085) (0.221) (0.185) (0.097) (0.149) (0.145) (0.082)(0.163)(0.168)(0.089)
Lag 5 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.09 0.07 0.01
(0.148) (0.134) (0.059) (0.110)(0.111)(0.059)
Lag 10 -0.29 -0.17 -0.12* 0.03 0.17 -0.14**
(0.189) (0.182) (0.067) (0.147)(0.143)(0.069)
Total ATE GSP -0.33* -0.40** 0.07 0.16 0.08 0.08
(0.193) (0.183) (0.074) (0.158)(0.158)(0.080)
PLUS -0.80***-0.87*** 0.07 0.19 0.05 0.14
(0.255) (0.241) (0.092) (0.190)(0.178)(0.095)
FTA 0.42 0.41 0.01 0.63** 0.59** 0.03
(0.402) (0.400) (0.123) (0.274)(0.281)(0.131)
SAA -0.84* -0.77 -0.08 0.27 0.29 -0.03
(0.481) (0.502) (0.189) (0.561)(0.490)(0.201)
ASS -0.46 -0.75* 0.29* 0.63** 0.39 0.24
(0.433) (0.448) (0.159) (0.314)(0.276)(0.160)
CU -0.06 -0.23 0.17 0.39 0.32 0.07
(-0.404) (0.344) (0.172) (0.302)(0.310)(0.165)
Fixed effects
Country-year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Pair yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 82661 82661 82661 60638 60638 60638 88803 88803 88803 65473 65473 65473
Standard errors clustered on country pair in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Toal average treatment effects
(ATEs) are calculated using a joint significance test. Constant and control are omitted because of space constraints.
GSP: GSP scheme and Economic Partnership Agreements, PLUS: GSP+ scheme and Everything but Arms, FTA: free
trade agreements and New Generation FTAs, SAA: Stabilisation and Association Agreements, ASS: Association
Agreement, CU: Customs Union and Economic Market, control: all other EIAs.
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Table 8: GLS estimation of a variation of the baseline model using fixed effects.
Import Export
(1) (2) (1) (2)
X IM EM X IM EM X IM EM X IM EM
NEIGHBOUR 0.44** 0.11 0.33*** 0.42* 0.12 0.31*** 0.39** 0.11 0.28***0.48*** 0.26 0.22**
(0.217)(0.204)(0.091) (0.243) (0.216) (0.103) (0.158) (0.154) (0.089) (0.178) (0.188) (0.096)
Lag 5 0.08 0.08 -0.00 -0.03 -0.07 0.04
(0.148) (0.143) (0.056) (0.107) (0.109) (0.059)
Lag 10 -0.27* -0.18 -0.09 0.02 0.12 -0.10*
(0.161) (0.155) (0.056) (0.128) (0.127) (0.058)
EASTEU 0.33 0.14 0.19** 0.19 0.09 0.10 -0.67* -0.84** 0.17** -0.63 -0.71* 0.08
(0.355)(0.309)(0.084) (0.351) (0.358) (0.074) (0.350) (0.375) (0.078) (0.427) (0.394) (0.082)
Lag 5 -0.63**-0.47*** -0.15 -0.09 0.08 -0.18
(0.269) (0.169) (0.193) (0.349) (0.188) (0.199)
EUROMED 0.34** 0.33** 0.02 0.26 0.26 -0.00 0.34*** 0.31** 0.03 0.32***0.33*** -0.02
(0.158)(0.149)(0.060) (0.176) (0.167) (0.060) (0.122) (0.128) (0.064) (0.118) (0.127) (0.065)
Lag 5 0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.03
(0.136) (0.136) (0.042) (0.110) (0.104) (0.044)
Lag 10 -0.35** -0.27* -0.08 0.02 0.13 -0.12**
(0.142) (0.141) (0.051) (0.108) (0.099) (0.053)
DISTANT -0.10 -0.05 -0.05 -0.21* -0.10 -0.10* 0.34* 0.41** -0.07 0.40** 0.52***-0.12**
(0.140)(0.132)(0.056) (0.125) (0.123) (0.056) (0.178) (0.166) (0.058) (0.178) (0.168) (0.059)
Lag 5 -0.06 -0.09 0.03 0.20 0.18 0.03
(0.149) (0.140) (0.038) (0.131) (0.121) (0.039)
Lag 10 -0.37** -0.26 -0.11** -0.14 -0.03 -0.10**
(0.180) (0.184) (0.051) (0.169) (0.173) (0.053)
FORCOL -0.51* -0.52* 0.00 -0.55 -0.46 -0.09 0.36* 0.34* 0.02 0.42* 0.41* 0.02
(0.292)(0.283)(0.121) (0.336) (0.326) (0.134) (0.212) (0.187) (0.125) (0.253) (0.227) (0.141)
Lag 5 -0.19 -0.35 0.16** 0.07 0.06 0.01
(0.279) (0.281) (0.083) (0.169) (0.142) (0.083)
Lag 10 0.27 0.01 0.26** 0.25 -0.02 0.28**
(0.402) (0.423) (0.117) (0.244) (0.202) (0.116)
Total ATE NEIGHBOUR 0.23 0.01 0.21 0.47 0.31 0.16
(0.393) (0.359) (0.158) (0.291) (0.307) (0.156)
EASTEU -0.44 -0.38 -0.06 -0.73 -0.63 -0.10
(0.313) (0.398) (0.223) (0.741) (0.535) (0.245)
EUROMED -0.08 -0.04 -0.05 0.41* 0.52** -0.11
(0.344) (0.342) (0.103) (0.223) (0.230) (0.109)
DISTANT -0.64* -0.46 -0.18** 0.46* 0.66** -0.20**
(0.328) (0.334) (0.093) (0.276) (0.278) (0.097)
FORCOL -0.47 -0.81 0.34* 0.75* 0.45 0.30
(0.560) (0.592) (0.200) (0.389) (0.334) (0.197)
Fixed effects
Country-year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Pair yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 82661 82661 82661 60638 60638 60638 88803 88803 88803 65473 65473 65473
Standard errors clustered on country pair in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Total average treatment effects
(ATEs) are calculated using a joint significance test. Constant and control are omitted because of space constraints.
Most EASTEU agreements only entered into force after 2003, hence lag10 is omitted from the estimation.
NEIGHBOUR: Iceland, Switzerland, Norway, Andorra, San Marino, Faroe. EASTEU: Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania
Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. EUROMED: Algeria, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Palestine.
Egypt and Israel. DISTANT: South-Korea, Mexico, South-Africa, Colombia, Peru, Honduras, Nicaragua, Chile and
Panama. FORCOL: Papua, CARIFORUM, Cameroon, Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Botswana,
Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, Mozambique and OCT.
24
exports, while Association Agreements also have positive lagged effects on exports.
When computing the effects of EIAs by “EU classification” on individual member
states, we obtain a similar picture. The effects of the different types of EIAs are not
statistically significant for the majority of EU27 countries. For the rest, results are
rather heterogeneous, with some countries experiencing positive total ATEs and some
negative. EIAs have clearly more positive effects on exports than on imports.
Another way of classifying the trade agreements is by geographical region. We
distinguish five regions: trade agreements with (1) neighbouring countries, (2) Eastern
European countries, (3) Euro-Mediterranean countries, (4) distant countries and (5)
former African colonies. We again swap out the FTA and CU dummy in equation (3)
by our new region dummies, while absorbing all other EIAs that are not captured by
these dummies in a control variable. Results can be found in table 8.
We find that trade agreements with neighbouring countries and Euro-Mediterranean
countries have a positive contemporaneous effect on imports and exports. For neigh-
bouring countries, this is completely driven by the extensive margin, while on the other
hand it is completely driven by the intensive margin for Euro-Mediterranean countries.
Looking at the total treatment effects, we see that these positive effects are offset by
negative lagged effects on the import side, but not on the export side.
Furthermore, we find that trade agreements with former African colonies have a neg-
ative contemporaneous effect on imports. The total treatment effect is not statistically
significant, however. On the export-side, these trade agreements have large positive
effects. We do not find statistically significant effects on imports for Eastern European
or distant countries, but we find strong negative (positive) contemporaneous effects on
the export-side for Eastern European (distant) countries. Total treatment effects are
not statistically significant for Eastern European countries. For distant countries, we
find a negative total treatment effect on the import-side, and a positive total treatment
effect on the export-side.
5 Conclusion
This paper is the first to quantify ex post the trade effects of EIAs between the EU and
third countries in a systematic manner. We used a panel data set on aggregate imports
and exports between 27 European Union countries and 203 third countries and territories
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for the period of 1988-2013. We accounted for the multilateral price/resistance term and
the endogeneity of EIAs by including three sets of fixed effects and, alternatively, by
using fifth differences. We started by estimating a simple baseline model and then
dissected the effects of EIAs in increasing detail.
Our results indicate that the impact of the European Union EIAs on trade is complex
and heterogeneous and that capturing the effects of EIAs by means of a single dummy
variable is inadequate. We find four main sources of heterogeneity.
First of all, EIAs do not have symmetric effects on imports and exports. We find
large positive and statistically significant effects of EIAs on exports, but effects on
imports are small or even negative. This suggests that the European Union leads a
successful trade policy and succeeds in concluding strategic trade agreements that boost
exports of European Union firms, while at the same time not increasing imports (and
thus competition) to the EU market. This is a surprising finding, given the many fears
and protests of producers in the European Union surrounding trade agreements.
Second, different types of EIAs have different effects on trade. We find that deeper
EIAs like FTAs and CUs have larger effects on trade flows than the more shallow PTAs.
Contrary to our expectations, we do not find that CUs have larger effects than FTAs.
This is possibly because EU CUs are not as deep and enforceable as EU FTAs. We also
compared the impact of each FTA and CU separately, and find that their effects are
very heterogeneous.
Third, EIAs have heterogeneous effects on total trade flows, as well as on the intensive
and extensive margins. Moreover, decomposing total trade flows into margins can yield
interesting findings, as the intensive and extensive margins sometimes have equally large
but opposite effects that cancel each other out, resulting in zero total trade flow effects.
These contrasting effects might explain why Kohl (2014) finds that the majority of trade
agreements do not have a significant effect on trade.
Fourth, EIAs do not affect all 27 member states of the European Union in the same
way. Most countries are not impacted by the EU EIAs (10 to 20, depending on the EIA
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Table 9: GLS estimation of the effects per agreement using fixed effects.
Imports Exports
X IM EM X IM EM
OCT -0.48 -0.51∗ 0.04 0.35∗ 0.30 0.05
(0.294) (0.284) (0.121) (0.213) (0.189) (0.125)
Egypt -0.08 -0.25 0.17∗∗∗ -0.19 -0.33∗∗ 0.13∗∗
(0.425) (0.413) (0.051) (0.134) (0.131) (0.053)
Iceland 0.44 -0.19 0.63∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.02 0.60∗∗∗
(0.339) (0.313) (0.103) (0.239) (0.233) (0.103)
Norway -0.29 -0.55∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.07 -0.16 0.23∗∗
(0.249) (0.236) (0.090) (0.188) (0.192) (0.095)
Algeria 1.07 0.64 0.43∗∗∗ 0.25 -0.16 0.40∗∗∗
(1.856) (1.890) (0.067) (0.196) (0.184) (0.065)
Andorra -0.27 -0.18 -0.09 0.12 0.41 -0.29
(0.478) (0.407) (0.282) (0.394) (0.330) (0.225)
Turkey 0.46 0.20 0.26∗∗∗ 0.17 -0.07 0.23∗∗∗
(0.285) (0.288) (0.084) (0.225) (0.223) (0.088)
Faroe 2.13∗∗∗ 1.57∗∗ 0.56∗∗ 0.84∗∗ 0.25 0.59∗∗∗
(0.664) (0.683) (0.218) (0.357) (0.432) (0.211)
Palestine 1.82∗∗∗ 1.43∗∗ 0.39 1.41∗∗ 0.75 0.66∗∗∗
(0.702) (0.704) (0.252) (0.672) (0.705) (0.221)
Macedonia 1.05∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ -0.27 -0.60∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(0.325) (0.238) (0.125) (0.183) (0.156) (0.116)
Jordan 0.48 0.09 0.39∗∗∗ 0.19 -0.17 0.36∗∗∗
(0.435) (0.406) (0.069) (0.216) (0.217) (0.062)
SanMarino 1.11∗∗∗ 0.47 0.63∗∗∗ 0.31 -0.28 0.59∗∗∗
(0.378) (0.398) (0.137) (0.339) (0.312) (0.183)
Chile -0.46 -0.52 0.06 0.33∗ 0.30 0.03
(0.311) (0.320) (0.062) (0.194) (0.190) (0.065)
Lebanon 1.06∗∗∗ 0.59∗ 0.48∗∗∗ -0.20 -0.64∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(0.306) (0.307) (0.072) (0.181) (0.175) (0.074)
Albania -1.54∗∗∗-1.72∗∗∗ 0.18 -0.43∗∗∗-0.70∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗
(0.402) (0.345) (0.150) (0.158) (0.189) (0.105)
Israel 0.43∗ 0.16 0.27∗∗∗ 0.24 -0.01 0.25∗∗∗
(0.219) (0.207) (0.068) (0.151) (0.156) (0.075)
Morocco 0.21 0.55 -0.34∗∗∗ 0.20 0.55∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗∗
(0.353) (0.352) (0.128) (0.208) (0.193) (0.133)
Tunisia 0.04 0.38∗ -0.34∗∗ 0.65∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗
(0.294) (0.230) (0.144) (0.305) (0.350) (0.145)
Mexico -0.03 0.14 -0.17∗ 0.25 0.43 -0.18∗
(0.200) (0.161) (0.096) (0.318) (0.312) (0.099)
SouthAfrica 0.08 -0.01 0.09 0.42 0.33 0.08
(0.175) (0.172) (0.059) (0.263) (0.231) (0.066)
0.175 0.172 0.059 0.263 0.231 0.066
Fixed effects
Country-year yes yes yes yes yes yes
Pair yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 82661 82661 82661 88803 88803 88803
Standard errors clustered on country pair in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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